Thank you very much, Chairman, for inviting

me. I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you and Senator

Hagel, Senator Feingold, Senator Sununu. And it is always an

honor to be working with General Jones, who has been an excellent

partner on this.

I prepared a PowerPoint, which I thought might actually be a

better way to go through some of this. So I hope you have it in

front of you.

Let me just start on the first page, or page two. I have given you

a map of Sudan. And the key aspect to take away, as many Americans

are unaware, this is the largest country on the continent. It

has nine neighbors in Africa, which suggests why you have such a

strong regional interest of what goes on.

Now the next page sets out the goals of U.S. policy. I always

think it is useful to be clear about what one is trying to accomplish.

And it certainly enables you to help assess our performance.

First, the goal of a unified peaceful Sudan that would contribute

to regional development and also cooperate with us on

counterterrorism. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that means

the key and full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accord

that Senator Danforth did so much to accomplish to deal with

the North-South strife.

But another important element will be economic development

throughout all of Sudan, because part of the precursors of this

problem has been the recurring cycle of famine and suffering that

leads to cross border violence and refugee flows. We also want to

have Sudan be a constructive participant in African in international

affairs and to strengthen our counterterrorism cooperation.

Second, to achieve this overall goal, we need to follow through on

the Government of National Unity that was created by the CPA,

make sure it is responsive to the needs of all of Sudan’s people and

accountable to them through free and fair elections.

The device for this is, again, the follow-through under the CPA

to have local, regional, and national elections in the four years. But

equally important is building the capacity of the southern Sudanese

government, because they will need this to be able to participate

effectively in a federalized Sudan.

Third, an end to the violence in Darfur, which needs to lead to

a reconciliation among the various tribal groups, eventually the

voluntary return of people to their homes, and accountability for

the perpetrators. At this point, our focus has been on humanitarian

care, expanding the security network for civilians in Darfur and

Chad through the security operations with also the tremendous

help of the NGOs and the international observers. I have had three

opportunities to visit Darfur over the past few months. The people

on the ground there are doing tremendous things under extremely

difficult conditions.

Fourth, and this relates to your opening statement, Mr. Chairman,

at the same time, I think we can do these things in ways that

strengthen the African Union’s capacity to provide basic security,

ensure humanitarian access, mediate political conflicts, and build

from what we hope will be a success for them in Darfur and Sudan.

And fifth, to demonstrate strong U.S. support for peaceful development

in democracy in all of Africa.

Now I am going to outline how we want to try to accomplish

these goals. But looking at page four I want to just touch on a little

bit of brief history, because I have found that in trying to understand

the problems today, it is very critical to have a sense of some

of the background.

Sudan as a country has been marked by ethno-religious

exclusivism since Khartoum traders and mercenaries first tried to

carve out a state through conquest in the Nile Valley in the 19th

century. Historically, it has been dominated by a very small clique

of traders, soldiers, and administrators. They tend to be drawn

from three tribes that are north of Khartoum. This is an important

point. Their orientation historically is toward the Arab world. So it

is to Cairo, Damascus, Saudi Arabia.

So, in effect, Khartoum has been an Arab metropolis that has

been surrounded by impoverished sub-Saharan expanses. In the

South, you have a traditional African tribal structure, animist and

Christian communities. In the West, in Darfur, you have a mixing

of Arab and African tribes, which have come over the centuries in

waves. Some of these people are actually connected to the Berbers

in Morocco, because there have been long migrations for either religious or trade purposes. There are links to ancient Saharan peoples,

Arab tribes from the North.

A point that I note is that this has led to a very complex mixture

of nomads and farmers that has created an economic condition that

is very dependent on a rain-fed boom and bust agriculture and

grasses. This can create, and has created, an instability in the past.

And frankly, Mr. Chairman, in addition to the Peace Accord that

we are trying to achieve in Abuja right now, it would need to be

combined, in my view, with a serious development effort so as to

try to avoid the frictions of the past breaking out again.

In the North, you have a mixture of Arab tribes that predominate

in urban areas. In the East, there has been generally an egalitarian,

pastoral group, the Beja that has ancestral ties to Egypt.

Now in the past, until 1989, the way that Sudan was run was

you had a very weak center in Khartoum that co-opted these constituencies

in the regions to create a power base. Indeed, there was

an independent sultanate or the Fur dating back to the 17th century

that was overthrown by the British in 1916. Indeed, the name

Darfur comes from homeland of the Fur, because that was the key

tribe there.

As many of you know, the history of British colonialism was an

indirect rule system. So what the British did was they replaced

this structure with an imperial native administration. They awarded

homelands to paramount chiefs. And in doing so, they displaced

this older, more fluid social order. And a key point, again, for the

current conflict is that some of the nomadic groups did not get

lands, because they were not settled agriculturists. This has set a

long fuse for the future.

The nature of this rule depended on the effectiveness of local

leadership in government. There was a very fascinating device by

which they used tribal conferences among these mixtures to try to

settled disputes. And I think this will be something that is important

in the peace process in the future.

Sudan itself achieves independence in 1956. If you turn to page

six, you will see this leads to the roots of the present-day conflict.

Given this history, you have a very strong resentment on the periphery

of the Muslim Arab domination in the center. And the

southern groups really start to struggle at the same time of independence

in 1956. There is a peace agreement in 1972 that fails

because it was not fully implemented, a caution for all of us today.

The government of Sudan tries to impose Shari’a Law in 1983. This

resumes the civil war under the leadership of the late Dr. John

Garang, a southerner who had been integrated into the army and,

as some of you know, studied in the United States, got his doctorate

at, I think, Iowa State or University of Iowa in agriculture

and economics.

This also is the first use of a counterinsurgency tactic that you

are going to see repeated, which is the government starts to mobilize

militias, drawing with a sense of cruel irony here from the

Darfur region of cattle-herding Arabs to lead their

counterinsurgency strategy in the South. It is a very basic strategy,

and it is a cruel one. It relies on brutality, starvation, and robbery

to wipe out the locals. There is an estimated two-and-a-half-million

people that died in that conflict, which stretches across 21 years.

And there are millions more displaced internally and externally.

Around the same time—and this is an important point to recognize—

Darfur starts to have its first conflict, again, in the mid eighties.

It is based on the economic conditions. There is a drought

and famine. There is a breakdown in migration. And at the same

time, as I know many of you, particularly the Chairman will recall,

this is the era in which Quaddafi was trying to move into Chad.

So he tries to use this region as a backdoor into Chad.

For the first time in this mixture—remember, Darfur is all Muslim.

It is not like the Christian South—he starts to divide the societies

by creating an Islamic legion and comes up with a racial ideology

of Arabism that plays into the present conflict.

In 1989, General Bashir overthrows the government, establishes

the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation to rule

over Sudan. The National Islamic Front is led by Dr. Turabi, who

takes over as the leading party.

In the late Seventies to early Nineties, you have a hyperinflation

that wipes out the middle class. Turabi is the leader of the vicious

war in the South. At the same time, he is actually reaching out to

Darfur, trying to bring in some of the less-accepted Muslim communities,

but he does not have a real effect in terms of development.

In 1992, there is a declaration of Jihad in Kordofan against the

SPLA. This is the southern group leading in the Nuba Mountains

rebellion. It is a failure to create an Islamic state through force. In

1998, again, the strategy of army, militias, and starvation in the

oilfield zones of Upper Nile province in southern Sudan is utilized.

During the nineties, Turabi hosts Osama bin Laden. With the

United States attack in 1998, we see the start of a rethinking on

the part of Bashir with Turabi. In 1999, there is a split in Khartoum.

As a result, Bashir arrests Turabi.

On the top of page eight is the introduction to the effort that the

United States launched under Senator Danforth in 2001 for a peace

initiative. At this time, the focus is primarily on the North-South

conflict. After September 11, the government of Sudan recognizes

the dangers that it sees. Bashir is fearful of his associations with

Osama bin Laden and the terrorists. He also realizes he cannot defeat

Garang and the SPLM militarily.

So the context for the CPA agreement, and I think this is very

important as we look to the future, is really politics driven by exhaustion.

The Khartoum government realizes it cannot beat

Garang in the South. It is worn down by decades of war. It has had

these ideological projects that have produced nothing. And this is

combined with Senator Danforth and major U.S. and international

pressure. This is what produces the North-South Accord that was

signed in January of 2005.

But I stress this because in my view the result was based on cold

calculation. This is not some epiphany. The leopard does not fundamentally

change his spots. And as we go forward, it is important

that, as we consider the use of pressure and power, as well as incentives,

that we keep that in mind.

The CPA accomplishes something very important. It creates a

new pattern of power sharing with the historical problem of geographically defined constituencies. It offers prospects of development.

They are developing oil resources. So they start to realize

there is an interest in getting linked in the international economy.

But outside Khartoum, and this is again the issue that we struggle

with today, there are two impulses. There is an impulse for

equality, which you can implement through the CPA Accord, and

emancipation. But that pulls people in the opposite direction. So

should the peripheries try to win the strongest possible representation

from the center or should they try to break away? This remains

the fundamental question of Sudan.

On page nine I point out that even as you have this negotiation

going on with the North-South Accord, Khartoum’s old habits and

fears of separation are also intentioned. In 2002, some Darfurians

start to complain about Arab militia harassment. The problem festers.

Some of the rebels attack a police station in 2003. So even as

Khartoum is negotiating with the South, it unleashes an army and

this brutal counterinsurgency strategy in Darfur in 2003.

We also suspect that some of the people in Khartoum felt that

the negotiators in the North-South Accord were giving away too

much. So you have this terrible sequence of loss of life, wide-spread

rape, and destruction of villages. Over two million people are forced

from their homelands. The violence is carried out by a combination

of government forces, Arab militia, and the rebel groups. And the

ties are not separate from the relationship in the South. Some of

the rebel groups, the SLA, has some ties with the SPLM in the

South. In this context, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. found

that genocide occurred on September 9, 2004.

The U.N. then conducted an investigation. They came to a slightly

different conclusion. They came to crimes against humanity, but

they said that this was basically a definitional issue. They had a

statement that it was similar in its effect to genocide.

But the other point about this is that, in addition to the North-

South and Darfur, one has to be alert to is that there are dangers

elsewhere in Sudan, the eastern provinces, as well as in Kordofan.

As I noted when I pointed at the map, there is a very strong African

interest in this, not only because of their empathy for the people

of Sudan, but they are worried about destabilization of nine

neighbors and the breakup of states. Because as they look at their

own colonial borders, the pattern of breakup of African states is not

one that anyone wants to see.

It is also an opportunity to demonstrate the African Union’s ability

to deal with African problems. And this goes to one of your

points, Mr. Chairman. As many of you know, there was an organization

called the OAU, the Organization of African Unity, until

2002. The Africans took what could turn out to be a very significant

step in creating the African Union, which has a special political

structure. It also has a structure to try to deal with some of

these security issues.

It establishes among African countries ‘‘a right to intervene in

international or regional conflicts.’’ So this is an important precedent

for Africans dealing with African problems.

On page ten, I just highlight the North-South Agreement, the

CPA. It was begun in 2002, signed on January 9, 2005. I have

talked on occasion with Senator Danforth about his tremendous efforts

to achieve this. And at heart, it tries to create a fair political

relationship, where you have power and wealth sharing leading to

national elections in four years. It has extraordinarily detailed implementation

requirements—some 1,100 items one has to track in

this process.

But among the key items, is a pre-interim period that was scheduled

to be completed by July 9. That set up the Interim National

Constitution. This in turn sets up a Government of National Unity

for a six-year period, which was just recently formed. It establishes

a new Institution of the Presidency, where Bashir is the president.

The first vice president was from the SPLM, Dr. Garang, now

Salva Kiir. Then the second vice president is Taha, the man who

had negotiated with Garang the North-South Accord.

It has a bicameral national legislature that was just established.

As I mentioned, on September 20 they announced the ministerial

cabinet. It establishes the legal basis for the Government of southern

Sudan. That is what is going on right now in southern Sudan—

creating the legislature perhaps today and a constitution.

Then, it sets up a process for competitive elections, oil revenue

sharing, joint integrated military units, and respect for human

rights. The ongoing leverage for the South is they have an opt-out

clause after six years.

Now as all this is happening, there is a terrible blow to the process

in that Dr. Garang crashes on July 30. I was in Asia at the

time, but I was very appreciative of the help of my colleagues. We

sent out a team from the National Transportation Safety Board

right away, which was important because, given the history of this

conflict, you can imagine the stories that were starting to spread.

There was communal violence that started to break out in Khartoum

and Juba and other places. You mentioned Special Representative

Roger Winter. He went out with our then Assistant Secretary

for Africa, Connie Newman, promptly to try to calm things down.

They and the statements of Mrs. Garang, who is an extremely

courageous person, Salva Kiir, who assumes Garang’s post, frankly

calms the situation down. But, and this is a point I want to stress,

we are in a very sensitive moment because of this. Dr. Garang was

a very strong leader in the system. So his organization, the SPLM,

is now trying to work through how to set up a government of

southern Sudan, how to be represented in Khartoum, how to help

us in Darfur. And it is a point of some stretch.

I have had a chance to talk to Mr. Kiir a couple times by phone.

I hope he will come actually to Washington in a month or two. And

if he does, I hope he has a chance to meet with some of you. He

is a military commander. He has not really had this kind of exposure.

I think it is important that he have a chance to talk to the

Congress, as well as the Executive Branch.

On the other hand, you also have a challenge for the people in

Khartoum. They worked out this arrangement with Dr. Garang.

And now they have a new set of players, and some of them may

be tempted to overreach. This goes back to the point I made about

the cold calculations.

There is another important issue, which is that Garang was the

one figure in the South that really stood for a unified Sudan. And

one of the questions will be whether his colleagues will remain

committed to this position.

On page 12, I just highlight what I think is a potential critical

issue, which is the connection of an upward or downward spiral.

On the one hand, the Comprehensive Peace Accord does much

more than settle the dispute between North and South. It actually

creates a political and a constitutional framework for people to try

to resolve the conflicts in Darfur and other regions.

We hope, as I mentioned, that the SPLM involvement in the Government

of National Unity could help us resolve Darfur. I spoke

yesterday to the new foreign minister of the Government of National

Unity, who is from the SPLM, Lam Akol, about trying to

work with us on these issues.

If we are successful, the backing that the United States and the

rest of the world has shown for the North-South Accord, including

financially, could create a positive incentive for these other regions

to come to peaceful accords. So the upward spiral is the implementation

of the CPA, a new Sudanese government, expanded AU mission

on the ground, and reconciliation in Darfur all within this political

framework.

But the point that I have made to people throughout the Sudanese

political structure North and South is there is a potential

downward spiral. If we cannot maintain peace and security in

Darfur, improve the situation, and move to a peace process, the

ability for us to support this new hopeful government is going to

be severely undermined. That is the downward spiral.

On page 13, I just mention some of Darfur’s needs. The basic

part, of course, is always supplying food and basic necessities. You

have some two million people that have been forced off their lands.

And at the same time, you have the need to improve security outside

the camps and inside the camps. But that is basically, for all

the work that that requires, that is a holding action. It needs to

be combined with a political reconciliation process, bringing together

the government, the rebel groups, and various tribes. That

is what is going on right now in Abuja, Nigeria, a peace negotiation.

As I have suggested, I think that is actually going to have to be

combined, if they reach a peace accord on paper, with some efforts

to deal with the economic and social issues that drove the conflict.

The good news is that it has been a good rainy season. Some improvement

in security and distribution of seeds suggests that we

are going to have a better planting season in West Darfur and

some of the other states. But the insecurity and limited access is

still going to interfere with this harvest. So we are going to be

needing to provide substantial food assistance throughout 2006.

One point of particular compliment here. When I go to Darfur,

I talk not only with the NGO workers, but our AID teams. And

they have done a fantastic job. These people, as I mentioned, are

in extraordinarily difficult conditions. They are adapting to an environment

that is still violent, still faces bandits, and, frankly, they

have done some heroic work.

The United States, and this is something we can be proud of as

a country, has provided 68 percent of the food delivered to Darfur

in 2005. It is an issue I raised with our European and other colleagues.

They are on the hook to do more, but it is something perhaps—

I know many of you meet with Europeans—we could put on

their screen a little bit more.

What you have seen at this point is some decline of harassment

of some of the NGOs by the government, but the rebel harassment

and banditry has increased.

The AU, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, is in the process of

expanding its security forces. They are currently up to the 6,000 of

the 7,700. We are extraordinarily pleased to have had help from

NATO and the EU in terms of the transport, logistical, and planning

support. Just to give you a little sense, since your opening

statement suggested an interest in the multilateral diplomacy aspect,

I first had a chance to talk about this with General Jones on

an earlier trip I took and stopped in Brussels and spoke to the

NAC ambassadors.

Secretary Rice also pressed to try to get NATO backing for this.

As you know, the EU then said, well, we want to be part of it. And

we said fine, let’s all do it together. Then we had to get the African

Union to ask for NATO’s help. But, it is a good example of how

NATO can adapt and change.

The deployment target for completion is October 2005. An important

part is not to see this only as soldiers. One of the most critical

operations is civilian police presence that is included in that. They

are expanding, the African Union is expanding their operation in

about 70 camps. And in particular—we will touch on this a little

bit later—we put a particular emphasis on the safety of women.

There are things that can be done inside the camps. We are going

to do some things in terms of crisis centers to try to help.

It is of some significance, if you think about this history of a colonial

area of Sudan, that we got them to accept the AU and the

NATO presence. This is something that we want to continue to encourage.

I was particularly pleased that the U.S. was able to form

a partnership with the Rwandans, who frankly—I was just talking

about this with General Jones—have been some of the better

troops. They have been through a genocide. We have brought two

of their three new battalions. I think over the next week or two we

are going to bring their third battalion.

We have also provided, since the African Union mission began in

2004, about $170 million of support. But this is an issue, just to

alert you and appropriators, we may have to come back to as we

go forward.

When Secretary Rice visited in July, she made a particular emphasis

on trying to emphasize using the Trafficking in Persons Report

to strengthen the efforts of women against such violence. We

worked out an arrangement actually where we are going to put in

additional resources, and the government of Sudan has also committed

to a series of steps, some of which include reviewing their

criminal procedures and investigations, these terrible reports that

these women have made. We have asked them to send out senior

women leaders from Sudan to talk about this issue. We are trying

to emphasize this is an overall part of the Darfur response.

In general in Darfur, what you have seen is the large-scale organized

violence has substantially subsided. But the situation remains

very fragile and dangerous. So you no longer have the government

forces in major actions. And until about a week ago, you

didn’t have major rebel forces in actions. But you still have the

Janjaweed and other militias undisbanded. They continue to contribute

to the violence.

And you also have a situation—there are no angels in this part

of the world—where the rebels are also grabbing cattle and trying

to stop humanitarian supplies. Keep in mind that one of the rebel

groups, the JEM, goes back in its links to Turabi, who was the

prime minister, or was the leader who was deposed, who had the

ties with Osama bin Laden.

What I am sure you have also noticed is that over the past week

there has been an upsurge in violence. Roger Winter is in the region

right now talking with the SLA leaders and the people in

Khartoum about this. This is particularly dangerous. This is a tinderbox.

And this is a place where you could imagine the cycle restarting.

Our best estimate is what has gone on is that some of the rebel

leaders were positioning themselves for the negotiations in Abuja,

because there are splits among the rebel groups. Frankly, one of

the important messages that I want to send today and I hope you

send is that no one should be engaging in violence. If people try

to think this going to improve their negotiating position, it is going

to undermine their position with us.

The progress in Abuja has started. It is very modest. There was

a Declaration of Principles that was signed on July 5. The AU has

done an important job in this. The man in charge of it is the former

prime minister of Tanzania, Salim Salim. But as I mentioned, some

infighting among the SLM rebels has impeded the talks. That is

something we are actually working on these very days.

This is a classic issue where to work this, we have to get everybody

pushing the rebel groups and the government to try to reach

an accord in the framework of the CPA. So we are working with

the U.N. special representative, the AU, and Europeans, Chadians,

the Libyans have contributed, and the Egyptians. We have to put

a common pressure on the parties.

We also have the follow-through on the U.N. resolutions on economic

sanctions and accountability, because it is vital that there be

a signal, particularly since it is dangerous that there is no impunity

for crimes. The ICC began its investigations in June. The goal

here is to provide a secure environment, and create an opportunity,

as I suggested before, to tribal reconciliation, so people can return

home in the start of 2006.

But this will be an ambitious tasking. To do this, one is then

going to have to take on disarming the militias, the huge challenge

of restarting life, which involves grazing rights and water issues,

tribal tensions, and a series of the historical topics I mentioned before.

Now, on the CPA follow-through, there is the need to follow

through on the financial support. I think in the letter you sent me,

Mr. Chairman, you asked about some of this information. This was

put together at an Oslo Donors Conference that I attended. There

were some $4.5 billion of pledges. I have given you an overview of

the U.S. support. I talked with the Norwegian development minister,

Hilda Johnson, who has done a very good job, and was in

Washington recently. Unfortunately, the government—well, I do

not want to complain about the new government—but the government

in Oslo is changing, and she will no longer be in this position.

Regardless, we need to work with the Norwegians and others on

the follow-up on their pledges.

One of the U.N. resolutions was to put a U.N. peacekeeping mission

in the South; and, again, to distinguish the AU mission in

Darfur. I have noted the progress on that. There are about 2,500

people that have been deployed. We hope for the final deployment

by the end of the year.

Then we have a major food issue, not only in Darfur but also in

the South. And here, just as the United States has provided about

66 or 68 percent in Darfur, we have provided about 61 percent in

the South.

The reason this is so important is you are now at a point where

you have to show that peace works. If people go home and they

cannot get food, you are going to have a hard time demonstrating

that you have a new future for Sudan. We expect the harvest to

be somewhat better. But you are talking about a couple million

people that could be coming back. So we are working closely with

AID on some basic packages to get them started.

Another issue that is very important is there has been a group

in the far south called the Lord’s Resistance Army that is led by

a crackpot who basically requires kids to go do his killing for him.

We have been working very closely with the Ugandans since this

group has operated traditionally out of northern Uganda. President

Museveni has been fighting the LRA. In the past, the government

in Khartoum was supporting the LRA. They have withdrawn that

support. Now it appears we have a situation where Khartoum, the

SPLM, and the Ugandans are all pushing together on the Lord’s

Resistance Army. There is some evidence I have seen that they

may have tried to flee to Congo. So we also have to press Congo

on this.

I also mentioned at the start, though, it is very important we

keep our eye on the formation of the government of Southern

Sudan. I have been to Rumbek. I went on my first visit, which is

in the south. It is pretty basic there. We are spending about $20

million for programs to help set up this government and about $17

million additionally on the security side.

We need to continue to push the Sudanese government on CPA

implementation as well, because there are other groups. I mentioned

at the start the Beja in the east, and there are some groups

in the north. This is a centrifugal force problem. We have to try

to urge them to continue to come to terms. And there has been

some good news on that front.

We also have to focus on the formation of the Government of National

Unity. As I mentioned, we had a team that arrived promptly

after Dr. Garang’s death. Salva Kiir and the SPLM have announced

their support for the CPA. The process is moving forward.

The New National Assembly, and President Bashir has made the

positive statements. The new ministers are being named. And

Jendayi Frazier, who is sitting behind me, our new Assistant Secretary

for Africa, is going to go out in a couple weeks and try to

meet the new government.

As I mentioned, previously, we also have to work with the government

about returnees in the South. There are about two million

people around Khartoum in IDP camps. Frankly, some of them

have been forced out violently. Thus we have been trying to work

with the Wali in Khartoum, as well as the national government to

stop that.

There are some key issues that I see regarding the CPA implementation.

We have had some delays resulting from Dr. Garang’s

death, but we need to keep pressure on the withdrawal of the Sudanese

army from the South, because Juba will be the headquarters

of the South. It is hard to build your headquarters if the

other army is still there. That has started.

We have to put in place the key mechanisms of the CPA. And

here the one I really want to stress is there is something called the

Assessment Evaluation Commission, which is to have oversight

over the whole process. That is one that I regularly pressed with

my calls yesterday and others with Vice President Taha recently.

That has to get in place and then some of these others, like the

National Petroleum Commission, which will involve the resource

sharing.

We need to have active SPLM engagement with the Government

of National Unity. And my point here is, Dr. Garang did this. This

is what he was about. But you have a new team here, and it is very

important that they have their place at the table and that they use

it. We need the parties and the powers in Khartoum to work seriously

with the SPLM. There can be a temptation with some of

these new players that they may try to work around them. There

is a new advisory council been appointed for the president that

looks suspiciously like a shadow cabinet.

And, as I mentioned, there are efforts against the Lord’s Resistance

Army. One other sensitive issue, just to alert you to it, given

the problems in terms of some of the discussions of land territories,

there was, as part of the CPA, a Boundary Commission for Abyei

set up to determine the boundaries of this region. It was chaired

actually by a former U.S. ambassador. It has come up with a finding.

And it is going to be a very complicated implementation, but

it needs to be implemented.

So finally, Mr. Chairman, in summary, as you can see, this is a

problem that has lots of threads. And while many people focus on

Darfur, what I am trying to do today is to emphasize, if you look

at Darfur without looking at the North-South, you are not going to

see the picture. We have to work on multiple transitions, from war

to peace, from centralization to a genuine federalism, emergency

problems to development, and military rule to democracy.

There is a chance for an upwards spiral, where these pieces could

fit together, or there is a chance for a downward spiral. This is a

classic multilateral diplomacy problem. We are working with the

AU, the EU, Arab League, and a whole series of partners on other

allies to make it work. I mentioned the trips that the Secretary and

I have made. Given the importance of this issue, and since Roger

Winter has been an active player in Sudan for some 25 years, and

worked as part of AID in the President’s first term, I asked him

to be my special representative to give me additional support on

the ground.

I know there is a strong interest in the Congress on this topic.

I appreciate that because we are going to need more support as

this process goes along, both in the messages that are sent and

with the resources. I will just perhaps say the obvious. It is not

going to be a smooth or clear-cut path. But I do think there is a

pathway ahead.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to take your questions.

Mr. Chairman, I will give you an overview.

And I am sure we could follow up with you and your staff in greater

detail, if you wish. Part of the challenge in dealing with this

issue in budget terms is, we put together our budgets for 2006 in

the summer of 2004. Well, as you have seen, it is a little hard to

preview some of these issues.

Now fortunately—and we have had excellent cooperation from

AID on this—in areas like food supplies, there are various emergency

accounts. There are accounts that are not just designed for

Sudan but can be adjusted for various purposes. I would highlight

for you a few areas.

One, we have discussed the African Union force. At the time that

budgets were put together in the 2004 period for 2006, we were

making an assumption that it might be a U.N. force in the west,

as opposed to the African Union force. And as you know, it is a different

peacekeeping account for U.N. than it is for general peacekeeping.

When this African Union force started to come in place, we

worked out language that allowed us to take some money from the

U.N. peacekeeping account, $50 million, over the past months. But

one issue will be what will be the ongoing needs of this African

Union force.

A topic I have talked about with Senator Biden in other context

is, there is some discussion about if at some point the African

Union force will transition to a U.N. force. Then it becomes a question

of that account. So one issue is the support for the peacekeeping

arrangements.

A second is the humanitarian supplies. And again, as I noted in

the tables at the back, we have some flexibility with AID and others

about how we program some of these funds, depending on the

food needs. But this is one we are going to have to watch together.

A third is, and I have already given you some sense the support

we have given to the government of Southern Sudan. These are not

necessarily large sums in terms of standing up. Remember, this is

starting from scratch. I mean, we are helping them create a national

bank. We are helping them create ministries, to list the use

of just some of the funds that we have devoted to this endeavor.

Now one of the issues legally we are going to have to work on

is that, as you know, we have imposed sanctions all over the place

in dealing with Sudan. We found ourselves with our hands tied in

helping with the new government of the South, given these sanctions.

So this has been an issue we have already talked about with

some people on the House side, that is to give us a bit more freedom

to handle some issues in the South.

The last piece of it is what I have suggested to you—and I cannot

go any further than really just put this on your screen—is if we

are able to get a peace accord in Abuja—and Jan Pronk, the U.N.

special representative, is pushing people to reach this by the end

of the year. That is going to be ambitious, given these problems

that I have described, but we may, I hope, make some further

progress.

If we can create conditions for people to start to return home, the

reason I perhaps gave you a little bit of the history here was because

it is not just going to be words on paper, we are going to

have to create conditions for people to actually make it and get a

start again. That is going to require a more serious development

effort. So that is more of the anticipatory area.

And the last part, Mr. Chairman, because I know many of you

spend time with people around the world, as I do—this should not

be only a U.S. show. You see, the United States is putting in about

68 percent of the food in Darfur and 61 percent for the country as

a whole. As you know, there is a big debate about food aid that I

read about on the trade side and, as you also know, the European

Union wants to cut down our food aid. Well, I hope then they help

supply some of the food aid here.

So, we need more help from some of the other players internationally.

And I think that this is one of the benefits of kind of

having multiple roles. I hit a lot of these people, but you can help

him, too.

No. And in fact, the U.N. Security Council

just extended the mandate of the southern forces to, I believe,

March of next year. One of the issues that we need to discuss with

the African Union is, you know, at some point what are their

thoughts about melding their force with the U.N. peacekeeping

force. Again, this is a point of some sensitivity. The African Union

is justifiably proud of what they have accomplished.

As I pointed out, they have expanded their forces. They are not

quite at the 7,700. And there is some discussion about trying to go

to 12,000. I am not sure whether they really could identify the

forces for this. This is a point that I know General Jones might

talk about.

We have helped with transportation. We have helped with logistics.

NATO ran a map planning exercise recently. From what I

have seen on the ground, we can also—I mean, we as a group—

Canadians, Europeans, others—can help is in terms of some of the

operational performance. You have platoons and companies out

there trying to play a role that is part military diplomacy, part

peacekeeping.

It is an evolving role for them. And, frankly, they have gotten

people wounded in the line of action. We have a lot of respect for

what they have done. We also have to think again with them at

what point does this transition into a broader U.N. force, too.

Yes. But it comes from different directions.

Let us start in the Darfur where I know a number of you have interests.

I think Senator Biden visited Chad. You have tribes that

go across these areas. The president of Chad is a Zagawa. They are

one of the key tribes along with the Fur and a couple others that

are a key part of the strife.

I met with the foreign minister of Chad recently. Part of what

we have done with the AU diplomacy and our bilateral diplomacy

is to try to keep everybody on the same sheet of music. They are

worried about destabilizing their own situation. The people of Chad

have, at some high cost, taken some 200,000 of the refugees. I do

not mean to highlight them as a problem. I am just saying that it

is an issue of the instability.

I mentioned Uganda in the South with the Lord’s Resistance

Army. That is another key point. In the East, there are very sensitive

relations with Eritrea and Ethiopia. Eritrea has had differences

with the government in Khartoum. That has been from

where some of the rebel groups have operated. A couple months

ago, we had some concerns about whether the Beja, this group in

the East I mentioned, was being stirred up by Eritrea. We have

talked with the Eritreans. The fact that there are difficulties with

Eritrea, Ethiopia, and with the border elsewhere makes this additionally

complex.

But I guess what I would emphasize, Mr. Chairman, is, and your

question draws this out, one reason I was trying to give people a

sense of this is that to accomplish the diplomacy in this, you are

working in a regional context. You have to do it. The good news

so far in Darfur is from Libya to the United States people were

pushing people to reach an accord. And we have to just keep that

pressure up.

That is one element, Senator, but there are

other elements. I think the government of Sudan unleashed this

merciless campaign. They thought that they could wipe these guys

out before everybody noticed. They were wrong. And that is why

I said at one point, these are all cold, hardheaded calculations.

They have now realized that that is not in their own interest. So

they pulled back their own forces. But the Janjaweed with their

links to the government is still around. I think the key is that it

won’t only be the point that you properly identified I hope will help

us, the presence of the southerners in the government, but also the

work of the African Union negotiators in Abuja and all these other

players I mentioned to Senator Lugar to put pressure on the rebel

groups and the government to reach an accord.

At this point, Senator, one of the greatest difficulties we are dealing

with is splits among the rebel groups. The government is at the

table. And I do not mean to say that they are, you know, angels

in the process. But they are ready to go. And, I do not only mean

the difference between the SLM and the JEM, but within the SLM

you have some different generations of leadership. And that is an

issue we are working very hard right now.

The key point, Senator, is that they are included

in the whole humanitarian effort. So when I talk about the

support for Darfur, I am also including what is the aid we are providing

for the 200,000 or so refugees in some 12 camps in Chad.

The whole project of humanitarian support applies to all those people.

Now second, this is why it is important that we not stop where

we are with humanitarian support and basic security. The point I

am trying to emphasize is we really have to keep pressing this

peace negotiation process forward so those people can go home, otherwise

they become an ongoing burden.

Third, I think I mentioned also I just met with the Chad foreign

minister last week around the U.N. meetings, in part to get a better

sense of how they see things and ways we can work together.

They are one of the co-mediators in the Abuja peace process that

is going forward.

I think we have a pretty good shared interest and connection

with them. But it is a good counsel to make sure that we are worried

about their stability, too.

Well, at this point, it is primarily energy

and energy development. Although if you look at one of the charts

I had in the back here, China is going to contribute to some of the

peacekeeping force in the South, which is a good effort and shows

responsibility. When I was in Beijing in late July, early August, for

some strategic discussions, and this is a point I made in a speech

recently as well, I emphasized to the Chinese that they needed to

consider that, as they were trying to develop energy resources in

various parts of the world—and this is not just Sudan, but it is

Burma, Iran, and others—they need to consider the impression

that that will create for us and for others when we see issues like

genocide.

I said they can make their own determination, but there are

probably ways we can work together. They can also maintain their

energy development. And I got a general response about willingness

to do that, to work with the government to try to press the

government to follow through on these accords. They benefit from

a stable system, too.

Indeed, one of the follow-up actions of the discussions that I had,

Senator, is that Assistant Secretary Frazer is going to have a discussion

with the Chinese about Africa in general. I think this is

something we need to do and broaden more. We may not be in

agreement on every issue, whether it be Sudan or Zimbabwe or

others, but it is important that they understand where there will

be costs in their relations with us and others. And I think there

is some chance that we can get some help. They will not be necessarily

as public as we are, but they might press the government

on some of the things we would like.

In the context of early this year, we had to

deal with what became the three Security Council resolutions—one

to set up the North-South peacekeeping force, one dealing with the

economic sanctions, and one dealing with the ICC and the issues

of impunity.

I do not know for sure on the peacekeeping force, but they are

participating. I do not recall any difficulty in that context. On economic

sanctions, they have been more resistant, as they have been

in other areas, but they accepted the type of sanctions that were

developed.

And on the ICC, I do not know, in particular. I was just trying

to make sure we could abstain, frankly.

Well, I am the overall point. The President

and the Secretary look to me to try to pull this together, whether

it involves AID, the various bureaus in the State Department that

have an interest, the NSC, DOD, and others. That is my role and

responsibility.

And on some of the things you mentioned regarding China, I

think I may be able to be of help. That is why I am raising this

in Beijing and talking about it in my speeches, because on this and

some other issues, since I am playing on multiple topics at once,

I can emphasize the priority of this for the United States.

I will give you another example. When I was in Egypt and meeting

with President Mubarak, I was emphasizing the importance of

us working closely together on this. When you get further away

from the African context, it is part of my role. Although, as I mentioned,

Assistant Secretary Frazer will be leading our discussion

with her Chinese counterpart to talk about Sudan and others.

Roger Winter, the special representative for me, works with the

Africa office. He does not have a separate office. He is attached to

my office representing the particular role and interests that I have

been asked to play on this issue. But he is very much integrated

with the African bureau. That is where the staff and the support

and the others involved come from. We had the good fortunate that

he did this before, when he was at AID working on the North-

South Accord.

His relations with Sudan are very extensive over many years.

This really gives us a tremendous asset in terms of some of the

people in the South and, I hope, dealing with some of the rebel

groups. But obviously, I look to Assistant Secretary Frazer to help

pull the overall effort together.

And as I mentioned, this is a topic where Senator Biden and the

Chairman mentioned there is just a heck of a lot of work to do with

a heck of a lot of players. So, I can do some of it. Roger can do

some of it. Andrew Natsios can do some of it. Secretary Frazer can

do some of it. I have weekly meetings where we are tasking these

things out and trying to anticipate and work the diplomatic problems

that arise day by day.

Well, again—and I know you know the region

and the issues very well—the African Union has come a long

way in a very short time. But not surprisingly, their basic problem

is one of lack of resources to make some of these things happen.

But the head of the African Union Commission is Chairman

Konare, who is the former president of Mali, a very poor country,

but democratic, has done a fantastic job.

As you mentioned in the case of Nigeria, there is an ongoing

president, in addition to the president of the commission, this has

been President Obasanjo. They have set up a series of, I think,

eight or nine commissions, one of the most important one being a

peace and security commission that is headed by an Algerian

named Djinnet.

So in some ways, Senator, if you can imagine the trials of the

European Union in a much poorer context, trying to come together

and work cooperatively, that is the work ahead of them. But what

I have been sincerely impressed by is, in a relative short time, after

having the strategy of hands off everybody and neighbors, they are

really trying to come to grips with these issues.

Now let me take it more directly. In the diplomatic side, the

Abuja peace talks were chaired by, I mentioned, former Prime Minister

Salim. We can help. For example, we probably have some of

the best ties with the SLA, which I was mentioning in one of the

previous questions. We need to let them know that we want them

to have a fair chance to negotiate an arrangement. But they also

cannot return to violence.

So this week, to be frank, to give you an insight on this, with

Roger being there, we pressed very hard. And I think it is because

of us, we have them back at the table. That is just a start. So there

are things that we can help diplomatically.

On the military side, and this is an area where I imagine General

Jones can comment more, they need everything from armored

personnel carriers, which the Canadians are helping to supply so

they can perform the mission better that Senator Biden talked

about, to paying the troops. We have provided in-kind support. This

is, as those of you who have been out there know, this is a rough

part of the world. And so troops have to be housed somewhere. We

have paid for that and set up with a group called PAE, a contracting

service, so they have places to live and operate. The troops

have to be paid.

So there are a lot of areas in terms of the resource side, if they

are going to have an effective mission.

Now this, I think, just looking ahead, Senator, this is one of the

bigger questions in some of the work we have been fortunate to do

with EUCOM. What investments do we want to make in this kind

of a peacekeeping mission over time to help develop their capabilities.

Because, frankly, it can be inappropriate for U.S. forces to be

there. So if we are going to deal with these problems, how can we

enhance their capabilities?

There is some other work that has actually just been started by

a former colleague of mine, David Gombert, at the National Defense

University, who is actually trying to see how, with some investment,

he might be able to use some of the net center capabilities

to have a rather small, but well-organized and well-prepared

force with sensors and information technology and others that

could really deal with these problems in the future.

I have encouraged David to talk to you, people on the Hill, and

also, frankly, we are looking at it in our office, and at the Department

of Defense. This is maybe a subject we could have some further

discussion about, if it is of interest here.

Well, I will tell you, frankly, I do not think

anybody knows. And I have said that publicly. And any of those

numbers, and this is an important point to have out, are way too

high, I mean, way too high to have that many people die.

Well, this opens a big debate, Senator. I will

just point out that our Office of Intelligence and Research have

done various estimates. It depends on what time period you start.

And they have looked at these with some 50 epidemiological studies.

It is all on our website explaining the logic.

Frankly, the U.N. World Health Organization Collaborating Center

for Research did a review in May with a 42-page document titled

‘‘Darfur, Counting the Deaths, Mortality Estimates from Multiple

Survey Data.’’ And they are basically in the same range that

we are.

To get to the numbers—and, you know, this is whether it is

160,000, 180,000, the U.N. representative of England has used the

180,000 number, but he has also referenced some of these U.N.

studies—to get to the number that you are talking—you mentioned

the high-end number—there are only two surveys that we are

aware of. They basically take the most intense period of mortality

in a rather limited area and expand them over a 26-month period.

That is probably an overestimate. But I hasten to say, you know,

that no one can know for sure.

So you and your staff can look at what we have on the website

and criticize it or analyze it. And again, you have very similar work

from the U.N. World Health Organization looking at some 50 studies.

Whatever they are, they are too high.

That, again, I am being careful. That is refugees

in Chad. So that is cross-border. As you said, you have some

two million-plus internally displaced.

Well, even more, I agree with President

Bush, who has made the same statement. So yes. And what happened

after that, Senator, is that we worked to pass a U.N. resolution

that set up a committee of investigation. The committee of investigation

reported in January of 2005. They did not find genocide, but they found crimes against humanity. Their statement,

probably just worth making sure that we have here on the record,

because I do not want them to have their position——

Right.

Well, it is what is now being pursued by the

International Criminal Court——

I would have to say yes. I mean, they were

part of the whole process that was going on.

You are moving through a couple different

topics here. So let me take each one. To be fair to the U.N., their

finding on January 25 was that this was no less serious and heinous

than genocide. What this deals with is a different view in

terms of the Genocide Convention of 1947 and 1948. So again,

crimes against humanity, which they found, is what we used in the

Nuremberg trials.

What I have tried to be careful about on this, Senator, is I do

not want to cast dispersions on people like President Mbeki, who

do not have the same finding we do. We all agree what happened

was outrageous. It was heinous. We believe it is genocide. They believe

it is crimes against humanity. We have to stop it. We have

to get it turned around and fixed.

What you are then asking about was the African Union mission.

And on this, the African Union mission was

expanded in May of this year after a review of its role. And again,

since these are African Union forces, we have made clear that we

could welcome an additional expansion of the mandate, if they so

chose. But it is important to have a sense of what these people are

really doing on the ground. Because it effects the nature of their

peacekeeping force, if you had the government actually engaged in

large-scale violence, they could not stand up to it. So it needs to

be combined with diplomacy to pull the government forces back,

which they have.

When I talked with the Rwandan deputy commander, who is a

first-rate individual, he described it almost as a military diplomacy.

Let me give you a practical example so you have a sense of what

they do.

On one of the visits that I was at, I had a presentation about the

location of the forces, the rebel forces, the government forces. It

was like a splotch on different maps. There was an NGO, Doctors

Without Borders, that had a hospital that said we may have to

close down because we are not getting people coming to our hospital.

The Rwandan commander who was with me pulled aside the

rebel officers—and this also tells you something interesting. They

have liaison from the rebels and the government with the AU

forces there—pulled them aside and basically said: Look, it is your

people who are dying. We have to negotiate some safe corridors to

get these people through, which is what they did.

So the nature of the peacekeeping mission here is one where

there is a certain deterrence factor. And as I said, recently, with

the expanded mandate, they put some armored personnel carriers

in some of the camps. But in the diplomatic context of where you

separate the forces, they are expanding their numbers, trying to

lessen the tension.

The reason I mention this, Senator, is that now and then there

is a sense that this will be solved if we give them a greater combat

mandate. I do not think that is the case.

Well, Senator, you know well the concerns

that the United States has as the greatest power in the world with

our forces around that our people could be subject to the International

Criminal Court. And I might add——

Senator, if I could finish the answer.

It is not just the administration. There is an act passed by Congress,

the American Service Members Protection Act, that reflects

this policy passed by the U.S. Congress.

So I think the important thing is, you are

right, we did abstain. And, under this act, we have the ability, if

asked to cooperate, to cooperate. As I said in the House, if people

ask for our help, we will try to make sure that this gets pursued

fully. We do not want to see impunity for any of these actors.

We are not failing to support the action of

the prosecutor in this effort.

And again, Senator, if you ask about U.S.

leadership on this issue, I think you will find that most people in

the world, the African Union I have encountered, the U.N. officials

I have talked to, feel that the United States, starting with Senator

Danforth, have really displayed some very important leadership.

So I do not think there is any question of our moral position.

Senator, I think the important part is,

frankly, not those actions, but it is what we are doing on the

ground. And I think what we are doing in terms of food, security,

diplomacy, making the CPA work, is what will demonstrate the

United States role in the history books.

Senator, let me start by saying the reports

that you have seen from the U.N. and the African Union, and I

think your comments reflect this, need to be put in a relative context.

It is still a very violent place. It is still a very dangerous

place. What has changed is the nature of the large-scale conflict

and warfare.

So I think that with what is still happening we should be pushing

to get civilian police monitors and a lot of other things to improve

the humanitarian security situation. I would add to that the

vagaries of weather. You have rainy seasons. You just had flooding.

You had some terrible conditions that I just read about a couple

days ago that have taken out a number of these camps. So it is a

precarious situation. It is extremely fragile.

What I have tried to emphasize, Senator, is a three-part formula.

One is we have to continue to be creative and move forward to get

the humanitarian supplies to these people, the food, fight the disease,

and try to improve the conditions for women, some of the

things I mentioned in the testimony.

Second, we need to expand the security arrangements. Part of

this is getting more of the African Union forces there, some of the

things I mentioned about civilian police somewhat equipping them,

some ways to be able to help execute the mission further, and then,

as we have discussed, to say what else one might need to be able

to do.

But if I could emphasize one point, it is that we cannot stop

there, because this remains very fragile and dangerous. So the

point that I have tried to emphasize is we have to get this Abuja

peace process forward so that we can try to use the type of framework

we used in the CPA to try to reach some peace accord.

You asked about a time frame. Jan Pronk, the U.N. Secretary

General’s Special Representative, has said we should try to get this

done by the end of this year, because that would allow people to

start to return home, if all goes well, before the rainy season next

year. I have used that comment to say yes, we should really try to

do that. It is going to be a stretch goal for the reasons I mentioned.

Yes. The evidence has shown, and U.N. reports

show this, the more forces there are, the more it helps improve

the situation. But this is an extraordinarily large area. So

that also goes to the ability of the forces to have the mobility to

execute their mission, some of the things I mentioned on the operational

planning side. And again, there are things that the African

Union is now doing to try with additional forces to create a confidence

environment. So you have probably read the stories about

women being afraid to go out and get wood. They are willing to go

out and get some wood.

Frankly, we are, also with the help of AID, trying to come up

with some stoves and other things that do not have to use as much

wood, so people do not have to go out as much.

I think there is going to now be an assessment when they get

up to the 7,700, which I hope will be at the end of October, about

where one goes next. And as I mentioned, there was some discussion

about willing to go to a higher number, 12,000. But I also see

the African Union’s straining to get up to the 7,700 number. They

have had some difficulty. There is a question about South African

forces that had been pledged and who else may go.

So we will have to work with the AU as they reach that point

to determine if there is a need for additional forces, can they provide

them. And as I have also suggested, whether you have a U.N.

peacekeeping mission in the South, can this be blended in some

fashion?

On the mandate issue, we are open to a more expanded mandate,

if they choose. They are their forces. They are their people. It is

in some ways a little presumptuous for us to tell them who they

should be fighting. Okay? But as I have suggested, I do not think

it is just a question of words on paper. It is a question about how

they feel and the execution of that mandate. And that, as I tried

to describe with Senator Dodd, one really has to see the situation

on the ground. It is not a situation where these forces are going

to be in a major military action with the other parties. They are

basically playing a deterrence role, a confidence building role, some

protection around the camps, and, frankly, mediation of these

forces.

Well, first off, as a policy matter, we would

not resist a stronger mandate, and for the reasons that I suggested.

Pardon? That is the question, Senator, as you said

‘‘do the job.’’ It is important to have a sense of what the job is.

We are going to press on all these points,

Senator. And let me start with even in the South, as they stand

up their new government, we need to make sure that it is a transparent

government so that as we provide aid and others provide

aid, we can be certain that we do not have problems of corruption.

As for how things will work with the Government of National

Unity, I stressed earlier the importance of the Assessment Evaluation

Commission, which will be an oversight body that will include

people from outside Sudan to help monitor these actions.

In terms of the overall support, for example, on the petroleum

side, after the Government of Southern Sudan is formed, there is

supposed to be a National Petroleum Commission formed that is

also supposed to examine these numbers and process it transparently.

So, Senator, the basic answer is I am not sure of anything. And

that is why I identified these topics. We have to keep pressing both

parties to make sure that it has full implementation. I certainly

would not take any of this for granted.

Yes. And what I was, again, trying to do

was draw some threads here together. I think for people to eventually

go home, Senator, it is going to require a peace accord, which

is not just AU military forces. It is going to require the disbanding

of the Janjaweed, which is not just a question of the AU going into

military action.

What I am trying to suggest here is that it is important for the

AU to be able to have the additional capability, the weaponry, the

words and mandate, but to see that action outside, loosely speaking,

the larger diplomatic and political context, I think runs a risk

of misleading about what can reasonably be accomplished here.

Just let me take a moment to give you one more sentence. The

critical point now is that the government of Sudan is not engaged

militarily as they were before. Their military capabilities could

overwhelm the AU forces. So as it is in traditional peacekeeping

missions, with people in the midst of a war zone, indeed, it is very

hard to have a peacekeeping force.

So it is the responsibility of us and other governments to make

sure that the government of Sudan does not undertake those military

actions, that they do not have the helicopters flying. That is

one of the things I spend time trying to make sure stays in place.

In terms of the African Union capabilities, I think more troops

will help. I think that getting them the armored personnel carriers

that they can have in some of the locations will help. And the more

that there are, I think the more areas that they are able to cover.

I spend a lot of time talking with a lot of outside groups on this.

I do not want to leave the false impression that to ‘‘solve’’ the problem

or do the job is simply a question of additional either AU or,

for that matter, other capabilities of a military nature. It has to be

a military diplomatic——

No, because that is why we and everybody

else are involved and, you know, we have a combination of sanctions.

We are using the African Union, the European Union, and

others to press them on action, and this goes to the point that I

also tried to make about the connection of the North-South Accord

with Darfur.

Look, Senator, some people consider this highly controversial. I

made the point that do not expect that the North-South Accord can

live in isolation from Darfur. So if, as a strategic matter, the people

in Khartoum want to try to have this Government of National

Unity work with all that could be with it. And you want us and

the international community to help, then we had better get Darfur

fixed.

Yes. That is an important part. I should

have mentioned this, Senator, to your first question about the several

types of resources. Because this is the exact concept we are

trying to get some of our transition support to help. Ambassador

Pasquel’s team has first helped on the southern side, as we are trying

to think about how to stand up the government of Southern

Sudan and how to deal with some of the security forces and their

reorganization.

There are also some other issues in the South as there has been

South-South strife, as well. You properly remind me that as part

of the team that I have at the State Department, they are part of

the team that I draw on this, and particularly, as we would also

turn to some of the things that I hope we will be able to do in

Darfur at another stage, I would expect them also to be involved

with that.

Yes. That is the point I was trying to make.

Yes.